@bitcoinization your bitcoin address is not a valid address (1NoobxB4vhyEVVjkE513UU9muGs)
Some (basic) thoughts on tx ambiguity and how to further weaken common heuristics.
Any suggestions of other example scenarios or suggestions appreciated.
random idea re. CoinSwaps. You could swap twice and end up with what you stated with. Then you each have a proof of dis-ownership. And no-one can know that the reverse swap exists.
Pros: Both parties can prove they *at some point* transferred ownership of the utxo away from themselves, and both have plausible deniability.
Cons: Both parties are unable to prove they don't *still* own the utxo. Think UK laws on decryption.
I've explained why in slightly more detail here:
BCash Combinatorial Mixing Tool review:
Interesting that they didn't deeply evaluate combinatorial linking attacks, just noted that they could (maybe) be possible.
The argument that multiple partitions solves this is also questionable - I'd have thought that many participants will have common outputs across the partitions.
Combinatoric security seems very weak to me - anyone have any thoughts?
Bitcoin is a part of the much broader battle between free and proprietary software.
Bitcoin facilitates freedom.
@waxwing made a great point in stephan livera's latest podcast (SLP149) that mirrors Stallman in the video below.
If you care about freedom - start using bitcoin properly (P2P). Don't use the proprietary platforms, protect your freedom at the cost of convenience.
@waxwing are you aware that the square crypto team looked at SNICKER in detail but we're dissuaded by the fact that it wouldn't work with watch only wallets.
Read about CoinJoin flagging, why it's an issue and what you can do.
# Extreme Ownership
Explaining with increasing accuracy what it means to 'own' bitcoin.
Please comment suggestions for improvements or better still, make pull requests.
“Bitcoin Backups” by 6102 https://link.medium.com/mN2i5pnsm3
In a similar vein, you probably wouldn't want wallets to let you use a SNICKER input pubkey to generate a new output spending a previous SNICKER output because the other participant will be able to roll back that transaction, eliminating the privacy for not only yourself but also your previous mix partner
The idea of having a Wasabi Bulletin Board is fine, but it could be the source of a targeted Sybil attack by analysis companies who want to link the unmixed change with the inputs (if it's not viable to link them onchain).
What would be particularly bad is if people make proposals to mix mixed outputs and use the Pubkeys of inputs to generate the shared secret - because the wasabi user would be revealing the link between their input & output to the other SNICKER participant.
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